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Abstract
We consider a model of financial contagion in a bipartite network of assets and
banks recently introduced in the literature, and we study the effect of power law
distributions of degree and balance-sheet size on the stability of the system. Rela-
tive to the benchmark case of banks with homogeneous degrees and balance-sheet
sizes, we find that if banks have a power-law degree distribution the system becomes
less robust with respect to the initial failure of a random bank, and that targeted
shocks to the most specialised banks (i.e. banks with low degrees) or biggest banks
increases the probability of observing a cascade of defaults. In contrast, we find
that a power-law degree distribution for assets increases stability with respect to
random shocks, but not with respect to targeted shocks. We also study how allo-
cations of capital buffers between banks affects the system’s stability, and we find
that assigning capital to banks in relation to their level of diversification reduces
the probability of observing cascades of defaults relative to size based allocations.
Finally, we propose a non-capital based policy that improves the resilience of the
system by introducing disassortative mixing between banks and assets.
1 Introduction
Financial institutions are increasingly diversifying their balance sheet across several asset
classes in order to reduce the idiosyncratic component of their portfolio risk. This has
led to increased global connectivity in the portfolio holdings across several institutions
(Battiston et al. 2012; Josselin Garnier et al. 2013). However, recent studies including
(P. Gai and Kapadia 2010; May and Nimalan Arinaminpathy 2010; N. Arinaminpathy
et al. 2012; Caccioli et al. 2014; Caccioli et al. 2012; Nier et al. 2007) have shown that
while increased interconnectivity can help diversify risk across the system, it also serves
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1 INTRODUCTION
as a contagion propagating and amplification mechanism whenever a crisis is underway.
This was partly the reason American International Group (AIG) was bailed out during
the financial crisis as many of the biggest financial institutions had become exposed to
it via derivative contracts (Scott 2012, provides more details). Financial institutions are
connected directly via inter-institutional lending (e.g. interbank and repo transactions)
and also indirectly through similar asset investments such as connections arising from
overlapping portfolios. While the former has drawn the most attention from studies
focusing on the role of counterparty and roll-over risks in propagating contagion (Caccioli
et al. 2012; P. Gai and Kapadia 2010; Prasanna Gai et al. 2011; N. Arinaminpathy et al.
2012; May and Nimalan Arinaminpathy 2010), academics and policymakers have only
recently begun paying close attention to the systemic risk posed by indirect connections
associated with overlapping portfolios (Caccioli et al. 2014; Huang et al. 2013).
These connections provide a contagion channel for the propagation of mark-to-market
portfolio losses to one or more financial institutions due to depression in asset prices
resulting from fire sales by a distressed institution holding the same assets. In some
cases, these losses may be sufficient to cause additional institutions to become distressed
thereby resulting in more rounds of asset fire sales and further depression in asset prices.
The 2007 quant crisis, for instance, was caused by a similar scenario in which the fire
sales liquidation of the portfolio of one equity hedge fund depressed prices of assets held
by other funds causing them to embark on additional rounds of selling which depressed
asset prices even further and resulted in large portfolio losses (see Khandani and Lo 2007,
for an elaborate discussion). The existing literature on overlapping portfolios have only
considered bank interlinkages arising from a single asset class (Cifuentes et al. 2005; Nier
et al. 2007; P. Gai and Kapadia 2010; N. Arinaminpathy et al. 2012). However, (Caccioli
et al. 2014) have recently generalised the fire sales model introduced in (Cifuentes et al.
2005) to the case of many assets. They characterised the stability of the financial system
in terms of its structural properties including average degree, market crowding, leverage
and market impact using a bipartite financial network model in which the contagion
channel is formed through local portfolio overlaps between banks with homogeneous
degrees.
However, their approach relies on the assumption of homogeneity in the degrees and
sizes of all banks which may not necessarily be the case. In fact recent empirical studies
(Guo et al. 2015; Braverman and Minca 2014; Marotta et al. 2015; Masi and Gallegati
2012) show that real financial networks of common portfolio holdings and balance sheet
size distributions deviate from this assumption. Specifically, they provide evidence of a
power law in these distributions. Following this findings, we generalise the approach in
(Caccioli et al. 2014) to account for power law in the degrees and sizes of banks. We refer
to banks with low degrees as specialised while those with high degrees are said to be
diversified. In this way, we are able to distinguish between the systemic risk contribution
of different categories of banks ranging from very specialised to very diversified banks.
Furthermore, we studied the effectiveness of various regulatory capital policy models
guided by the intuition developed from the systemic risk contribution of the different
types of banks. We then investigated the possibility of improving the system’s stability
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by introducing structural correlation into the network without imposing new capital
requirements. Finally, we characterise the stability response of the system with respect
to leverage.
The model used for our simulations belongs to the same class of contagion mecha-
nisms used extensively in the literature of counterparty network models (Nier et al. 2007;
Upper 2011; P. Gai and Kapadia 2010). In a nutshell, the system is exogenously per-
turbed and the resulting impact is recursively propagated through the network until no
new default is observed. This feedback mechanism is essentially driven by asset devalua-
tions based on a market impact function that revalues an asset with respect to its traded
volume (Bouchaud and Cont 1998; Bouchaud et al. 2009). Our goal is to understand the
impact of heterogeneity in the portfolio structure of banks on financial contagion due
to overlapping portfolios. As such, we abstract from strategic processes used by banks
in choosing a particular portfolio structure as in (Wagner 2011), who shows using a
microfounded model that in equilibrium the risk of joint liquidation motivates investors
towards heterogeneous portfolio configurations. Moreover, the mechanistic approach we
consider keeps the model general enough for stress testing real financial systems by cal-
ibrating the model. We further assume passive portfolio management so as to keep the
dynamics simple (i.e. banks do not deleverage or rebalance their portfolios during a cri-
sis). In this sense, a bank’s portfolio remains fixed until it becomes liquidated whenever
it defaults. This assumption can be justified from the fact that most financial markets
are illiquid relative to the positions held by large institutions such that whenever a cri-
sis is underway, banks usually have insufficient time to deleverage until they become
insolvent (see Caccioli et al. 2014, for an elaborate discussion).
Our stress tests reveal that heterogeneous bank degrees and sizes make the system
more unstable relative to the homogeneous benchmark case with respect to random
shocks but not with respect to targeted shocks. In contrast, heterogeneity in asset con-
centrations makes the system more resilient to random shocks but not with respect to
targeted shocks. We then proceeded to study possible capital policy models guided by
these results and find that a regulatory policy that assigns capital to the most spe-
cialised banks performs better than random assignments when the average degree is
high. Moreover, diversification is a more significant factor than size in improving the
financial system’s resilience with capital based policies. The insights we develop can be
used to address one of the major drawbacks of the Basel accords in ignoring the role
of diversification for setting capital requirements (CEBS 2010). An example is the risk
weighted capital requirement framework which is heavily criticised for providing banks
with incentives to concentrate in low risk asset classes such as interbank loans, sovereign
debt etc. which not surprisingly turned out to be at the centre of the 2007 financial
crisis (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2012). Finally, we investigated the possibility of
improving financial stability with a non-capital based policy that imposes a particular
configuration in the bipartite network and find that disassortative mixing (i.e. connect-
ing the most specialised banks with the most concentrated assets) increases the stability
of the system.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we outline the main
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features of the model. In section 3, we explore the stability impact of heterogeneous net-
work topology and balance sheet sizes. section 4 provides insights on the effectiveness of
capital based policies and proposes a non-capital based policy by introducing structural
correlations into the bipartite network. In section 5, we study the impact of leverage on
our model. Finally, a summary of our findings is presented in section 6.
2 The Model
2.1 Network
As in (Caccioli et al. 2014), we consider a bipartite network of a financial system con-
sisting of N banks and M assets as shown in Figure 1. A link from bank i to asset j
implies that j constitutes part of the portfolio of bank i. We define ki as the degree (i.e.
the total number of links) of bank i. Hence, the average bank degree is defined as:
µb =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ki (1)
Similarly, we can define the average degree of the assets as:
µa =
1
M
M∑
j=1
li (2)
Where, lj is the number of banks holding asset j in their portfolio. It is the case that
the number of links emanating from both sides of the bipartite network must be equal
i.e. µbN = µaM . Thus, we have that µb = µa whenever N = M .
Figure 1: A Heterogeneous bipartite financial network. Banks are depicted in red circles
while assets are shown in blue. The links of the banks follows a power law distribution
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2.2 Balance sheet structure
A typical bank’s portfolio in the network discussed above consist of investments in non-
liquid assets (e.g. shares in stocks) and liquid assets (e.g. cash). Figure 2 depicts the
general structure of a bank’s balance sheet. We have defined a bank’s proportion of liquid
Assets(A0i ) Liabilities
Non-liquid
assets Deposits
Liquid assets
e.g Cash
Capital
(1− θ)A0i
Ci = θA0i E0i = γA0iDi
Figure 2: A typical bank’s balance sheet structure. The bank holds a fixed amount of
its asset in the form of cash, which value is assumed to remain fixed throughout the
simulation for the purpose of simplicity.
assets and initial capital as 20% and 4% of its total assets respectively for consistency
with previous work (Caccioli et al. 2014; P. Gai and Kapadia 2010). Moreover, reports in
(Upper 2011) suggest that the capital structure of banks in advanced economies typically
conforms with this configuration. We define the total asset of bank i at any time t is
defined as:
Ati =
M∑
j=1
Qijp
t
j + Ci (3)
Where Qij denotes the number of shares of stock j held by bank i, p
t
j is the price of
stock j at time t defined as:
ptj = p
t−1
j fj(x
t
j) (4)
Where xtj denotes the quantity of asset j sold at time t The capital (equity) of bank i
at time t is given as:
Eti = A
t
i −Di (5)
In the model, a bank is declared insolvent whenever its initial capital endowment E0i is
completely eroded due to losses incurred from the depreciation of its asset values. Hence,
we define the solvency condition for a bank i as:
A0i −
M∑
j=1
Qijp
t
j − Ci ≤ E0i (6)
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We can also express the solvency condition for bank i as a condition on its initial leverage
defined as λi = A
0
i /E
0
i i.e.
λi ≤
∑M
j=1Qijp
t
j + Ci
E0i
+ 1 (7)
Hence, leverage is a necessary condition for a bank to fail since an unleveraged bank i.e.
(λi = 1) would always satisfy Equation 6.
2.3 Contagion mechanism
A typical simulation in our model follows the sequence enumerated below:
Step 1. Exogenously shock the system at time step t = 0
Step 2. Check banks for solvency condition as in Equation 7 at each successive time
steps t = 1, 2, ..
Step 3. Liquidate the portfolios of any newly bankrupt banks and re-compute asset
prices 1
Step 4. Terminate the simulation when no new default(s) occurs between successive time
steps.
This dynamics is captured by the flowchart depicted in Figure 3
Any new
defaults?
Exogeneous
Shock
Liquidate portfolios &
recompute assets' prices
Check for new
insolvent banks
Terminate
Yes
No
Figure 3: Flowchart representation of the contagion mechanism. A Bank is only declared
bankrupt whenever it becomes insolvent.
2.3.1 Exogenous shocks
We consider two kinds of initial shocks: random and targeted shocks. In a random
shock, a bank or asset is randomly selected and exogenously perturbed while a specific
kind of bank or asset is perturbed in the case of a targeted shock.
1In order to keep the model simple, we assume that the liquidated assets are traded with parties
outside the banking system.
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2.3.2 Market impact
We assume a market impact function of the form fj(xj) = e
−αxj as in (P. Gai and
Kapadia 2010; N. Arinaminpathy et al. 2012; Cifuentes et al. 2005) such that xj is the
liquidated fraction of asset j. The price of asset j is then updated according to the rule:
pj → pjfj(xj). As in (P. Gai and Kapadia 2010; Nier et al. 2007; Caccioli et al. 2014),
we set α = 1.0536 such that the liquidation of 10% of an asset results in a 10% price
drop in the asset’s value.
2.3.3 Systemic stability
We characterise the stability of the financial system in terms of the systemic risk posed
by an exogenous shock. We define systemic risk as the probability that contagion occurs.
In the context of our model, contagion is said to occur only when the number of cascading
defaults resulting from an exogenous shock exceeds a critical threshold φ. We define φ
as 5% of the total number of banks in the system for consistency with previous work on
financial contagion (P. Gai and Kapadia 2010; Caccioli et al. 2014).
3 Stability Analysis
The existing literature on financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios have only
considered banks with homogeneous (i.e. similar) degrees and sizes (see Caccioli et al.
2014; Cifuentes et al. 2005), for instance, (Caccioli et al. 2014) consider a homogeneous
financial network using an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi bipartite networks. However recent empirical
studies by (Guo et al. 2015; Braverman and Minca 2014; Marotta et al. 2015; Masi
and Gallegati 2012) have shown that real portfolio networks are far removed from such
distributions. In particular, they show the existence of a power law in the degree dis-
tributions in a network of overlapping portfolios similar to the observations reported in
(Boss et al. 2004; Caccioli et al. 2015) for counterparty networks.
3.1 Heterogeneous bank degrees
In this paper, we desire to investigate the stability impact of heterogeneity in the degree
of banks. As such, we consider a heterogeneous bipartite financial networks where the
degrees of banks are generated according to a power law distribution i.e. P (k) ∝ k−γ
with γ = 2.5. Each bank then forms a link with a random asset until it reaches its
generated degree such that no bank is linked to an asset more than once. This link
formation approach implies that the number of links of the assets follows a Poisson
distribution since every asset has the same probability of being selected. A bank’s
degree can be interpreted as its level of diversification since it denotes the number of
different investments of the bank. We have used the term specialised bank to mean a
bank with focused investments in contrast to a bank holding a diversified portfolio. Our
focus here lies in understanding the systemic risk contribution of different types of banks
ranging from very specialised to very diversified banks without mixing in the influence
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of size. This approach mandates an assumption of the same balance sheet sizes across
all banks.
In the left panel of Figure 4, we plot the probability of contagion as a function of
µb when a random bank fails. We compare the unstable region for the system with het-
erogeneous bank degrees relative to the homogeneous case. We find that the unstable
region is wider in the heterogeneous system. The right panel of Figure 4 shows that this
observation is independent of the kind of exogenous shock. In particular, we plot the
contagion probability for the case when an asset is randomly devalued and still find that
heterogeneity in banks’ degree results in greater instability. The existence of a wider un-
0 2 4 6 8 10 12µb00.20.40.60.81Contagion Probability
(a) Bank shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12µb00.20.40.60.81Contagion Probability
(b) Asset shock
Figure 4: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µb for the case when a
random bank fails. Red circles: system with heterogeneous bank degrees. Blue squares:
system with homogeneous bank degrees. Right Panel: Contagion probability as a func-
tion of µb for the case when a random asset is devalued. Contagion is worse in the
heterogeneous system irrespective of the kind of exogenous shock. Result refer to 1000
simulations for N = M = 1000
stable region in the heterogeneous system can be understood by observing that contrary
to the homogeneous case, the heterogeneous system is characterized by a few highly
diversified banks and many specialized banks. Hence, the probability that a specialized
bank is hit from the initial shock is relatively higher. Consequently, specialised banks
induce higher devaluations on their assets since they hold large amounts of these assets.
However, this result is in contrast to general reports in the complex networks litera-
ture in which heterogeneous network topology has been shown to create more stability,
for instance, (Caccioli et al. 2012) show that heterogeneity in a counterparty network
creates a more robust system relative to the homogeneous case. The reason for this lies
in the fact these previous works have considered a network of direct bilateral exposures
between the heterogeneous agents such that the few hubs (i.e. the most connected)
nodes become the most systemically relevant whereas the specialised nodes are the most
systemically relevant in this case due to the fact that they concentrate their invest-
ments in specific assets and thereby carry higher liquidation risk. This result sheds
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some light to why specialised institutions like mortgage banks, building and loan asso-
ciations, specialist funds etc. who hold significant amounts of specific assets should be
considered systemically important as the fire sales of these assets conditional on their
default may have devastating impacts on asset prices. Moreover, this finding provides
further credence to the conjecture given by Andrew Haldane, the Bank of England’s
Chief Economist, in one his speeches that the ”rapid growth in specialist funds poten-
tially carry risk implications, both for end-investors and for the financial system as a
whole” (Haldane 2014). Furthermore, (Wagner 2011) also suggests imposing higher di-
versity requirements on portfolio holdings of financial institutions with high liquidation
risk relative to those with low risk.
In Figure 5, we show the impact of targeted shocks on the stability of the system.
We plot the probability of contagion as a function of µb when the initial shock is aimed
at specific banks. We find that the unstable region is widest when any of the top 5%
most specialised banks is hit while targeted shocks on any of the top 5% diversified
banks results in the smallest unstable region. This can be understood from the fact that
banks hold lesser amounts of specific assets with increasing degrees since we assume here
that all banks are endowed with the same asset sizes. Hence, targeting shocks at the
most diversified banks would effectively close the fire-sale contagion channel quicker since
only small amounts of assets would be sold, which implies lower price devaluation than
the case when banks are randomly perturbed. However, the reverse is observed when
shocks are directed at the most specialised banks since they hold significant amounts
of specific assets and thereby carry higher liquidation risk. We refer to these banks as
”Too Specialised To Fail” (TSTF).
0 5 10 15µb00.20.40.60.81Contagion Probability
Figure 5: Contagion probability as a function of µb when banks have heterogeneous de-
grees. Blue squares: contagion probability when a random bank fails. Green diamonds:
contagion probability when shocks are targeted at the most specialised banks. Red cir-
cles: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at only the most diversified banks.
The region where contagion occurs is widest when specialised banks are targeted. Result
refer to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000
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3.2 Heterogeneous asset concentration
In the previous section, we introduced heterogeneity into the distribution of the banks’
degrees and the number of banks holding each asset is homogeneous. In this section,
we turn our attention to the case when the distribution of the number of banks holding
each asset class is heterogeneous and the degree distribution of banks is homogeneous.
We follow the approach of the previous section and assume a power law distribution in
the asset concentrations. An asset’s concentration can be interpreted as the preference
of banks towards that asset class. Our aim is to study how this preference structure
affects the stability of the entire system.
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Figure 6: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µa for homogeneous and
heterogeneous distributions of asset concentrations. Blue squares: system with homoge-
neous asset concentrations. Red circles: system with heterogeneous asset concentrations.
A random bank fails in both cases. Introducing heterogeneity into the distribution of
asset concentrations results in a more robust system. Right Panel: Targeted shocks on a
system with heterogeneous asset concentrations. Targeting concentrated assets amplifies
contagion probability. Result refer to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000
In the left panel of Figure 6, we plot the probability of contagion as a function of
average asset concentration for the case when a random bank fails. In contrast to the
results observed for heterogeneous bank degrees, we find that introducing heterogene-
ity in the concentration of the assets produces a more robust system relative to the
homogeneous system. This can be understood from the fact that the probability than
a highly concentrated asset is perturbed is relatively low since the scale free network
comprises very few concentrated assets and many less concentrated (i.e. isolated) ones.
This effectively reduces the unstable region since fewer banks are affected by contagion.
The right panel of Figure 6 shows the stability impact of aiming initial shocks at
any of the top 5% most concentrated assets. As expected, targeting initial shocks at
these highly concentrated assets has the effect of amplifying contagion since more banks’
portfolios are negatively affected by the initial asset devaluation. However, the width
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of the unstable region is essentially the same as in the homogeneous system. This is
so because as soon as banks reach a critical average degree they become resilient to
contagion irrespective of the kind of shock on the asset side.
3.3 Heterogeneous bank sizes
In the previous sections, we assumed that all banks have the same balance sheet sizes in
order to separate the influence of size from diversification. However, empirical evidence
in the literature clearly suggest that banks also have largely heterogeneous sizes (Boss
et al. 2004). For instance, a recent data analysis by SNL Financial shows that the top
5 biggest banks have 44% of the total assets held by banks in the U.S. (Schaefer 2014).
Our aim in this section is to study the impact of this kind of heterogeneity in the size
distribution of banks on the stability of the financial system. To do this, we model the
bank sizes according to a power law distribution i.e. P (A) ∝ A−γ resulting in the creation
of a few banks with significantly larger asset sizes than most banks whilst abstracting
from the influence of diversification by assuming a Poisson degree distribution.
In the left panel of Figure 8, we plot the probability of contagion as a function
of µb for the case of random bank shocks. We find that contagion halts much faster
when banks have homogeneous sizes relative to the heterogeneous case. The following
argument provides an intuition to why this is the case. In the heterogeneous system,
the fire sales impact on asset prices is more severe whenever any of the large banks are
hit as these banks hold significant amounts of their assets relative to the entire system
since we have assumed a Poisson degree distribution. This effectively shifts the critical
threshold for which contagion is no longer possible to the right.
The right panel shows the contagion probability as a function of µb for the case of
initial shocks to specific banks. We observe that the system is significantly more unstable
when exogenous shocks are targeted at any of the top 5% biggest banks but more stable
when the shocks are targeted at any of the top 5% smallest banks. This follows from
the fact that big banks hold comparatively larger amounts assets for each value of µb
relative to other banks, which implies that targeting shocks at them would cause higher
devaluations of the asset classes they hold, effectively fuelling the contagion mechanism
that leads to a wider unstable region. We refer to these banks as ”Too Big To Fail”
(TBTF).
In summary, the findings of the stress tests conducted in section 3 are the following:
(i) Introducing heterogeneity in the degrees of banks exacerbates the fragility of the
system to random shocks in contrast to (Caccioli et al. 2012; P. Gai and Kapadia
2010) who show that a scalefree counterparty network results in a more robust
system with respect to random shocks. We find that this result is independent of
the type of exogenous shock (i.e. bank or asset shock). Furthermore, we find that
targeting the most specialised banks makes the system more unstable.
(ii) Heterogeneity in asset concentrations improves the resilience of the system to ran-
dom shocks in contrast to heterogeneous bank degrees. Moreover, targeting highly
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0 2 4 6 8 10 12µb00.20.40.60.81Contagion Probability
(a) Random shocks
0 2 4 6 8 10 12µb00.20.40.60.81Contagion Probability
(b) Targeted shocks
Figure 7: Left Panel: contagion probability as a function of µb for homogeneous and
heterogeneous distribution of banks’ sizes. Blue squares: system with similar balance
sheet sizes. Red circles: system with heterogeneous balance sheet sizes. The system
is subject to random bank failures in both cases. Contagion probability is wider in
the heterogeneous system relative to the homogeneous case. Right Panel: Targeted
shocks on a system with heterogeneous distribution of banks’ balance sheet sizes. Blue
squares: contagion probability when a random bank is perturbed. Red circles: contagion
probability when shocks are targeted at the biggest banks. Green diamonds: contagion
probability when shocks are targeted at the smallest banks. Targeting shocks at the
biggest bank results in the widest unstable region. Result refer to 1000 simulations for
N = M = 1000.
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concentrated assets increases the probability of contagion, however the average
degree threshold where contagion dies out is effectively unchanged.
(iii) Cascading default is halted slightly faster when banks have homogeneous sizes rel-
ative to the heterogeneous case and is greater when exogenous shocks are targeted
at the biggest banks.
4 Policy Impact Analysis
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has precipitated calls for higher regulatory capital require-
ments for banks. Although higher capital requirements can improve financial stability,
they however carry some implicit costs 2 namely reduced profitability for banks and
higher lending cost which may have a negative impact on social welfare (IMF 2016;
Bridges et al. 2014; Brooke et al. 2015). Hence, it is important that new regulatory
capital requirements are assigned to banks in the way that gives the most stable config-
uration. To this end, we investigate how the intuition developed from the stress tests in
section 3 can influence capital based regulatory policies. We then propose an alternative
non-capital based policy by studying the structure of the bipartite network.
4.1 Capital based policy
Here, we compare the performance of possible capital policy models following the intu-
ition developed in section 3. In each model, the same amount of capital χ is injected
into the system. The difference in the policies lies in the way χ is distributed amongst
the banks.
4.1.1 Targeted versus random
The stress tests done in section 3 suggests that the ”Too Specialised To Fail” and ”Too
Big To Fail” banks are systemically important. Hence, it becomes interesting to ask if
assigning capital requirements to only this group of banks can improve financial stability
relative to targeting a random group of banks. We consider two kinds of targeted policies.
In one, we assign the capital equally to only the top 5% most specialised banks and refer
to this policy as TS while in the second, which we call TB, only the top 5% biggest
banks are required to hold more capital. We model a random policy for the purpose of
comparison. In the random policy, 5% of the banks are randomly selected and assigned
additional capital requirements equally.
TS : We now investigate the stability impact of the TS policy relative to the random
policy as such we abstract away from the influence of size by assuming similar balance
2This is based on the assumption that Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold, which essentially
implies that a bank’s capital structure does not affect profit or social welfare in an idealised world without
frictions such as interest payments on debts, taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs (Franco Modigliani
1958).
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sheet sizes across all banks. We show this comparison in left panel of Figure 8 by
computing the ratio R of the contagion probability of both policies as a function of µb
such that R = 1 implies similar performance, R > 1 means the TS policy supersedes the
random policy and R < 1 implies that the TS policy outperforms the random policy. We
focus our analysis on only those regions where contagion occurs in both systems to avoid
divisions by zero. The plot suggests that a policy that focuses on the most specialised
banks results in greater stability relative to a random policy in the region with high
values of µb, which is significant from a policy perspective because real world financial
networks are more likely to be in this region.
The right panel of Figure 8 provides an insight to why the TS policy outperforms the
random policy. It shows the probability that a bank i with degree ki defaults before the
occurrence of contagion. The plot suggest that the specialised banks are the most likely
to default before contagion occurs. As such, it is reasonable to conjecture that focusing
the capital policy on these banks is more likely to increase the resilience of the system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7µb02468R 0 100 200 300 400ki00.050.10.150.2Pr(Within 5% Initial Defaults)
Figure 8: Left panel: Stability impact of TS policy relative to the random policy for a
system with heterogeneous bank degrees. Dotted line: comparison basis i.e. R=1. The
TS policy produces more stability relative to the random policy for high values of µb.
Right panel: Probability that a bank i with degree µi defaults before contagion occurs.
The most specialised banks have a greater chance of defaulting before contagion occurs.
TB : We now abstract from heterogeneous degrees and consider only heterogeneous
sizes in order to study the stability impact of the TB policy relative to the random
policy. We show this comparison in left panel of Figure 9 by computing the ratio R of
the contagion probability of both policies as a function of µb such that R = 1 implies
similar performance, R > 1 means the TB policy supersedes the random policy and
R < 1 implies that the TB policy outperforms the random policy. The plot markers
oscillate around 1 suggesting that a policy that focuses only on the biggest banks is not
effective.
In order to understand why the TB policy does not perform better than the random
policy, we plot the probability that a bank i with size Ai defaults before the occurrence
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5 10 15µb0.911.11.21.3R 101 102 103 104Ai00.010.020.030.040.050.06Pr(Within 5% Initial Defaults)
Figure 9: Left panel: Stability impact of TB policy relative to the random policy for a
system with heterogeneous bank sizes. Dotted line: comparison basis i.e. R = 1. The TB
policy appears to be ineffective relative to the random policy. Right panel: Probability
that a bank i with size Ai (shown in log scale) defaults before contagion occurs. The
biggest banks have a greater chance of defaulting before the occurrence of contagion.
of contagion in the right panel of Figure 9 and find that big banks have a smaller chance
of failing before contagion occurs. This implies that allocating capital requirements to
only these banks is likely to be ineffective in the context of this model.
4.1.2 Diversification versus size
In the previous section, we simplified the model in order to separate the impact of
diversification and size. However, it is also interesting to ask which of the two factors
namely diversification and size is the more significant factor for capital requirement
policies. In order to facilitate this comparison, we introduce heterogeneity into the
degrees and sizes of the banks. The diversification based policy we consider assigns
capital requirements to banks based on their degrees such that banks with higher degrees
are required to hold lesser capital i.e.
i =
1/ki∑
i 1/ki
χ (8)
Where, ki denotes the degree of bank i. While the size based policy allocates capital
requirements to banks based on the size of their balance sheets such that big banks are
required to hold more capital i.e.
i =
Ai∑
iAi
χ (9)
Where, Ai denotes the size of bank i. In Figure 10, we compare the stability impact of
a diversification based policy relative to a size based policy by computing the ratio R of
their respective contagion probabilities as a function of µb such that R = 1 implies similar
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performance, R > 1 means the diversification based policy supersedes the size based
policy and R < 1 implies that the size based policy outperforms the diversification based
policy. The figure suggests that assigning capital based on a bank’s degree supersedes
assignment based on size further confirming recent findings reported by Cai et al. 2012.
2 4 6 8µb12345R
Figure 10: Stability impact of policy based on diversification relative to policy based on
size as a function of µb for a system with heterogeneous sizes and degrees. Using banks’
diversification levels as a proxy for assigning capital requirements is superior to using
bank sizes.
4.2 Non-capital based policy
From a policy maker’s perspective, it is interesting to ask if there is a network structure
that improves systemic stability without imposing new capital requirements (see Thurner
and Poledna 2013, for example)? We address this question by introducing some struc-
tural correlation into the bipartite network. In the subsequent paragraphs, we use the
term ”assortative network” for a bipartite network in which the most diversified banks
hold the most widely held (i.e. concentrated) assets and ”disassortative network” for
one in which the most specialised banks hold the most widely held assets while the most
diversified banks hold the least held assets. The correlated networks are generated based
on the algorithm proposed in Noh 2007. The procedure essentially involves minimising
a network cost function until a stationary state using Monte Carlos simulations. This
cost function is defined as:
H(G) = −J
2
N∑
i,j=1
aijkikj (10)
aij
{
0, if i = j
1, otherwise
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Where, ki =
∑
j aij and J denotes a control parameter for tuning the level of assortativity
i.e. J < 0(J > 0) gives a disassortative (assortative) network respectively while J = 0
produces an uncorrelated network.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12µb00.20.40.60.81Contagion Probability
(a) Bank shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12µb00.20.40.60.8Contagion Probability
(b) Asset shock
Figure 11: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µb for different network
correlation configurations subject to the initial failure of a random bank. Blue squares:
Uncorrelated network. Red circles: Assortative network. Green diamonds: disassor-
tative network. The disassortative network gives the most stable configuration, while
the assortative network results in the most unstable system. Right Panel: Contagion
probability as a function of µb for different network correlation configurations. Again,
the disassortative network gives the most stable configuration.
In the left panel of Figure 11, we study the resilience of the system as a function of µb
for the different network configurations for the case when a random bank fails. The right
panel shows the same plot but for the case when a random asset is devalued. In both
cases, we find that the disassortative network produces the most stable configuration.
This is so because in a disassortative network, assets with high concentration are held by
the most fragile banks (i.e. banks with low degrees). This implies that fire sales impact
on the asset prices resulting from the default of any of these fragile banks would be
minimal. However, in the assortative network, assets with low concentration degrees are
held by these fragile banks, which implies that the fire sales resulting from their default
would be much more severe thus leading to a wider unstable region. This result raises a
question of whether it is possible to implement a structure of incentives that makes the
bipartite network disassortative?
5 Impact of Leverage
We now study the joint role of leverage (i.e. λ) and average degree (i.e. µb) on the
stability of our heterogeneous system. In Figure 12, we show that the existence of the
critical leverage threshold for which contagion occurs with non-zero probability reported
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in Caccioli et al. 2014 for a homogeneous system is preserved when banks have hetero-
geneous degrees for each µb and that this threshold is increasing with µb irrespective of
other prevailing conditions. This suggests that it may be possible for a financial regula-
tor to permit higher leverage in the system by promoting an appropriate diversification
strategy that achieves a particular value of µb which may not be individually optimal
for the banks similar to the findings reported in (Tasca et al. 2014; Beale et al. 2011).
Figure 12: The non-white region refers to parameter values of λ and µb that result in
non-zero contagion probability. There is a critical leverage value below which the system
is stable for any value of µb.
6 Conclusion
Previous studies on overlapping portfolios have relied on the assumption of homogeneity
in the degrees and sizes of banks, however, empirical findings show that real financial
networks deviate from this assumption (Guo et al. 2015; Braverman and Minca 2014;
Boss et al. 2004; Marotta et al. 2015; Masi and Gallegati 2012). In particular, they
provide evidence that bank degrees and sizes follow power law distributions. In our
work, we generalised the model recently introduced in Caccioli et al. 2014 to account for
these features. This approach makes it possible to study the systemic risk contribution
of different types of banks with varying degrees and sizes. We found that separately
introducing heterogeneity into the degrees and sizes of the banks widen the unstable
region relative to the homogeneous case with respect to the initial failure of a random
bank but not with respect to targeted shocks. In contrast, heterogeneity in asset con-
centrations makes the system more resilient to random shocks but not with respect to
targeted shocks.
Based on these intuitions, we proceeded to study possible capital policy models.
Our findings suggest that a regulatory capital policy that assigns capital requirements
to the most specialised banks performs better than random capital assignments when
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the network connectivity is high. However, focusing capital requirements on only the
biggest bank does not appear to be effective relative to random assignments within the
context of our model. Furthermore, we investigated the relevance of using diversification
or size in building the capital based policies and find that the diversification based policy
outperforms the size based policy with increasing network connectivity.
We then proposed a non-capital based policy that improves financial stability by
introducing structural correlation into the bipartite network. Our results suggest that
disassortative mixing (i.e. connecting the most specialised banks with the most concen-
trated assets) improves the resilience of the system. This can be understood from the
fact that the fire sales impact of the specialised banks is significantly reduced due to the
smaller quantity of traded shares relative to the entire volume of the assets. Finally, we
studied the joint role of leverage and average degree on the stability of our heterogeneous
system and found that the existence of a critical leverage beyond which contagion occurs
with non-zero probability for each average degree reported in Caccioli et al. 2014 for a
homogeneous system is preserved when banks have heterogeneous degree distribution.
This finding further reinforces calls for policy makers to compensate for higher system
risk induced by higher leverage by promoting an appropriate diversification strategy.
In an ongoing work, we plan to break away from the mechanistic stress test mod-
els used in this paper and consider a more realistic agent based model in which the
systemic risk from overlapping portfolios is endogenously created. This way we can im-
plement measures to disincentive banks from structuring their portfolios in a manner
that increases the fragility of the system.
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